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Abstract Regarding the effect of product variety on purchase probability, there
exist findings which demonstrate a positive effect of variety for small assortments
and a negative effect of variety for large assortments. Despite these results, little
evidence exists about the causal mechanism of this effect. We conduct a field study
among German consumer electronics customers to investigate the previously pro-
posed constructs of anticipated product utility, anticipated regret and evaluation
costs. The results suggest that anticipated regret and evaluation costs play a pow-
erful role in explaining the negative link between variety and purchase probability
for high variety assortments. Anticipated product utility on the other hand serves to
explain part of the positive causality for low variety assortments. The results ob-
tained give rise to recommendations for the planning of assortments.
Keywords Product variety  Mediator analysis  Regret  Evaluation costs 
Product utility
JEL Classification Numbers M30  M31
1 Why variety matters
Recent research has emphasized the importance of product variety and how it
impacts profitability and specifically consumers decisions on whether or not to
purchase a product (e.g., Iyengar and Lepper 2000; Gourville and Soman 2005).
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This work has shown that variety can have a substantial impact on revenues. For
example, Boatwright and Nunes (2001) present field data where changes in variety
resulted in increased revenues of up to 11%.
Given the heterogeneity in tastes across consumers, economic theory would
predict that larger variety assortments should be beneficial to consumers and
consequently result in increased sales (e.g., Kreps 1979). Intuitively, this
assumption seems plausible. At the very least it seems reasonable that people
cannot have too many options. For example, if a consumer is looking for a DVD
player and is trying to decide between three models, then an additional fourth
model should not decrease her purchase intention. After all, the fourth option may
be the exact option she is looking for. If this proves not to be the case, she can
return to the original three options previously compared. Consequently, consumers
should not be worse off with additional options but should instead benefit from
larger variety assortments. Certain empirical evidence seems to support this claim.
Positive relationships between variety and assortment size have been shown for
satisfaction and confidence in the impeding decision (Jacoby et al. 1974), the
attractiveness of an assortment (Ratner et al. 1999) and choice of an assortment
from which to shop from (Kahn and Lehmann 1991; Glazer et al. 1991;
Broniarczyk et al. 1998).
However, recent research calls this positive belief about variety into question.
Specifically, research demonstrating this relation has been criticised for failing to
provide a close approximation of reality since only small- to medium-range
assortments have been taken into consideration. For example, Kahn and Lehmann
(1991) present their subjects with only two (small variety) and six (large variety)
options. Also, Jacoby et al. (1974) limit themselves to 4, 8 and 12 options. Product
variety that exceeds such amounts may well break the boundaries of the span of
perceptual dimensionality (Miller 1956). Several studies have demonstrated that key
marketing variables such as confidence in the purchase decision, satisfaction, and
also the decision to transact a purchase are negatively influenced, given a
sufficiently large number of alternatives (Malhotra 1982; Huffman and Kahn 1998;
Schwartz et al. 2002). Results obtained by Iyengar and Lepper (2000) are
particularly striking. Employing a field experiment, the authors show that the
purchaser share of customers interested in marmalade falls from 30 to 3% if the
number of options is increased from 6 to 24.
Thus, current empirical evidence clearly shows an inverted U-shaped relationship
between perceived variety and purchase likelihood of consumers planning a
purchase. Specifically, up to an optimal point, perceived variety appears to increase
purchase probability, after which, purchase probability decreases. Despite the
results supporting this notion, previous research has been largely limited to the
demonstration of effects. Several intervening variables that might explain the causal
mechanisms behind the phenomenon have been merely proposed but remain
empirically untested. For instance, Iyengar and Lepper (2000, 1003) conclude by
asking ‘‘how can there be so much dissatisfaction in the face of so much
opportunity?’’ and call for further research on intervening variables. Other authors
are more specific and call for research on potential mediators, such as anticipated
regret (Schwartz et al. 2002), evaluation costs (Levav et al. 2006) or the
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attractiveness, i.e., anticipated utility, of the most favourable option (Chernev 2006).
Knowledge about such mediators is important as it highlights levers companies may
use to increase or decrease the effect of variety.
This paper aims to fill this gap by theoretically exploring why and under which
conditions these variables might explain the relationship between variety and
purchase probability. In addition, empirical results of a field study are presented that
tests the explanatory power of these factors and demonstrates how they are related.
With the aid of these results, this article aims to illuminate the causal process
between variety and purchase probability.
2 Hypotheses on the causal mechanism between variety and purchase
probability
Given the inverted U-shaped relation between variety and purchase probability
found in previous research, different causal mechanisms may be at work for low
and high variety assortments. Consequently, the first question to be considered is
why perceived variety increases the probability that consumers will make a
purchase if the assortment is below a medium range. In answering this question,
the important concept of utility comes to the fore. Economists traditionally assume
that individuals will choose the product that maximizes their subjective utility
(Hicks 1939). Kahneman et al. (1997) explain that one must distinguish between
the anticipated utility relevant to the decision and the utility actually experienced
by individuals. It is assumed that individuals will choose the option through which
the expected need fulfillment will be maximized (Vodopivec 1992; Harsanyi
1997). In reality, it is often not possible for individuals to identify and compare all
available options because the amount of information is impossible either to obtain
or to process. Consequently, there exist search costs in the form of limited
cognitive and monetary resources (Shugan 1980; Stigler 1961). This decision of
whether to choose one of the presently available alternatives—as shown in
numerous empirical studies—involves consumers weighing anticipated utility
against the cost of a continued search (Ratchford 1982; Corbin 1980).
Accordingly, the ‘‘no-choice’’ option is chosen when none of the available
alternatives appears to be sufficiently attractive or when the decision-maker
suspects that she can identify alternatives with a higher anticipated utility by
means of a continued search (Dhar 1997).
Larger assortments allow consumers to satisfy individual needs by permitting
better compatibility between individual utility functions and the characteristics of
the alternatives offered (Chernev 2003; Lancaster 1990; Loewenstein 1999). Larger
assortments thus increase the probability that the anticipated utility of a presently
available option will exceed the utility of a continued search. Accordingly,
individuals who are hesitant to make a purchase indicate the expected utility of the
best alternative as one of the central reasons for their decision to purchase a product
anyway (Greenleaf and Lehmann 1995). Other research confirms that individuals
explicitly cite the anticipated utility of the best alternative as the reason for their
preference for large selections over small ones (Broniarczyk et al. 1998; Kahn et al.
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1987). According to economic theory, however, it cannot be expected that new
options will create constant additional utility. More reasonable appears the
assumption of a decreasing marginal utility due to additional options.
In summary, it is thus to be expected that the relation between product variety
and purchase probability can be explained by the anticipated utility of the best
alternative. If a decreasing marginal utility is indeed present, anticipated utility
should function as a mediator, especially with small assortments.
H1: with small assortments, the positive effect of variety on purchase probability
is mediated by the anticipated utility of preferred alternatives.
If anticipated utility is able to explain the relation between variety and purchase
probability for small assortments, then the question arises as to what explanation
can be found for the negative correlation with large assortments. An obvious
construct is decision costs, which increase with the number of alternatives. Social
psychologists have long known that individuals can be conceptualized as
cognitively lazy (Zipf 1949). They are prepared to invest mental resources in a
task such as decision-making only when they anticipate sufficient compensation or
when they feel compelled to do so. In order to keep the decision costs at a minimum,
so argue decision theorists, individuals invest exactly that level of effort in a
purchase decision as will allow them to exceed at least a minimum level of expected
satisfaction (Simon 1955, 1990; March 1978).
Customers can pursue any number of paths to reach that goal. Thus, a variety of
information processing strategies is conceivable with which individuals can reach a
satisfactory information level (Frisch and Clemen 1994; Beach and Mitchell 1978;
Shugan 1980). Individuals have at their disposal a process of the highest possible
precision by which they objectively process and subjectively assess all units of
information and condense them into a preferential judgment. To be able to cope
with more complex problems, they can also access a number of heuristics. Heuristic
decision-makers save on cognitive effort by ignoring information and in this way
risk making a sub-optimal selection. Decision theorists speak of a lower precision
in relation to complete information processing (Anderson 2003; Bettman et al.
1998).
A number of empirical studies confirm the most well-known model by Payne
et al. (1993), according to which individuals try to act in such a way so as not to
exceed an individually varying maximum of effort and not to fall short of a
minimum of precision (Timmermans 1993; Johnson and Meyer 1984; Ford et al.
1989). Within those two parameters, individuals choose the action which is most
closely aligned with their individual preferences between precision and effort.
Medium variety can already lead to a situation in which complete information
processing is not feasible since the number of options at that level gives rise to a
disproportionate increase in the decisional effort required. If variety continues to
increase, also preferred heuristics with reduced information processing increasingly
exceed the maximum cost of decision making until finally, from a certain level of
variety on, the satisfaction minimum between precision and effort is achieved with
no further course of action. Independent of where the exact parameters of minimum
precision and of maximum cost are for individuals, it is evident that with a large
product variety fewer and fewer heuristics are available.
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In such a constellation, the decision-maker is in conflict between two unwanted
states: producing an unpleasantly high level of effort in product choice or
transacting a purchase at an unappealingly low level of precision. Such conflicts
especially reduce the motivation of making a choice and consequently purchasing a
product (Anderson 2003; Tversky and Shafir 1992). As noted, consumers generally
possess a number of strategies to deal efficiently with low- to medium-range product
variety (Payne et al. 1993). This suggests the assumption that a constraint on
applicable heuristics which is sufficiently strong for the delay of a purchase will
develop, especially with medium to large assortments. Consequently, the decision
cost, especially from medium-sized assortments on, should function as a mediator
between variety and purchase probability.
H2: with large assortments, the negative effect of variety is mediated by the
decision cost.
Proponents of regret theory argue that rejected options play a strong role in
consumer choice. For example, consumers who decide to purchase a digital camera
find themselves in a situation where the decision in favor of one product necessarily
results in the rejection of competing alternatives. If the consumer decides to
purchase a cheaper lower quality alternative he rejects a high-end offering; if she
opts for a feature rich, expensive camera she rejects cheaper ones. Following regret
theory, every rejected option can lead to regret. In this state, individuals ponder the
mistake made and suffer under the belief that they could have made a better
decision.
Analogous to utility and anticipated utility, the literature distinguishes between
two forms of regret: on the one hand, after a decision, regret arises in cases where it
has become evident that a rejected option would have been the better choice
(experienced regret). On the other hand, individuals anticipate before decisions that
they may feel regret over their choice (anticipated regret) (Zeelenberg 1999a).
Loomes and Sugden (1982, 820) note regarding this issue: ‘‘... regret rests on two
fundamental assumptions; first people experience the sensation we call regret [...];
and second, that in making decisions [...] they try to anticipate and take account for
those sensations...’’. In the case where the decision-maker cognitively anticipates
regret, anticipated regret leads to regret-as-possibility entering into decision-making.
Regret can thus have an influence on the decision without actually being felt.
Decision theorists argue that perceived variety increases anticipated regret
(Loewenstein 1999; Iyengar and Lepper 2000). Because of product variety,
consumers are confronted not only with effort but also with psychological costs in
the form of doubt, uncertainty and mental strain. If customers expect post-purchase
anguished thoughts about whether they have made an optimal purchase, they will
necessarily see themselves as bearing even more responsibility if the assortment is
larger or the freedom of choice is greater (Weiner 1982; Schwartz et al. 2002).
While with a small selection, justification on the basis of a lack of options is
possible, a large selection allows less room to maneuver psychologically. The
consumer finds herself confronted with the psychological pressure of having to
accept personal responsibility for potentially negative experiences. Moreover, more
alternatives inevitably result in the consumer having to reject more options. While
with a range of six digital cameras, five will be rejected, with 30, the customer is
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forced to decide against 29 others. Consequently, for the decision-maker faced with
a larger number of options, it is simply more probable that a sub-optimal choice may
be made (Wathieu et al. 2002; Schwartz 2000).
Regret has been shown as one of the major drivers of the decision to postpone a
purchase (Beattie et al. 1994; Zeelenberg et al. 1996). A clear and frequently
replicated result is that individuals in situations of negative experience feel more
regret if the experience is a result of personal action than if the experience is
preceded by inaction (Gilovich and Medvec 1995; Kahneman and Tversky 1982;
Landman 1987). A shareholder, for example, will experience particularly deep
regret if he sells his stock and then later discovers that the stock price has risen
substantially. That same lost profit, however, would inspire markedly less regret if
the price of his stock had not changed and he had foregone the chance to take a stake
in the same positive stock price development but with another company (Kahneman
and Tversky 1982). In terms of the monetary gain both cases are identical. However,
the second case is psychologically different from the first in that active action would
have been needed to make the profit.
Given this background, if individuals want to avoid future regret, they would be
well advised to undertake as little active action as possible. In other words, it can be
expected that abstaining from imminent action is a direct function of anticipated
regret. Indeed, it has been shown that individuals increasingly tend toward inaction
if the potential results of their options for action include especially negative
eventualities (Baron and Ritov 1994). Individuals are also more apt to postpone a
purchase if they are explicitly asked to consider regret, if they feel a higher degree
of responsibility for a particular course of action or expect direct feedback regarding
the quality of their decision (Kordes-de Vaal 1996; Ritov and Baron 1995). With
each of these contexts, anticipated regret increases in lockstep with increased
abstention from action. To summarize, it can be stated that anticipation of regret is
likely to favor inaction (Kahneman and Tversky 1982).
Analogous to evaluation cost, it cannot be assumed that anticipated regret is able
to generally explain the relation between product variety and purchase probability.
As pointed out earlier, a number of causes of anticipated regret can be identified.
Additional options should be able to have an effect on regret only when consumers
see themselves as unable to make a completely well thought-out purchase decision.
With smaller assortments, the effect of variety on regret can be seen as ambiguous
because with extremely small assortments, the assumed lack of potentially attractive
options may also lead to regret (Greenleaf and Lehmann 1995). With large
assortments, on the other hand, this phenomenon can be expected, if at all, then only
to a minor degree. In this context, the positive relation between the number of
alternatives and anticipated regret delineated earlier should clearly dominate.
H3: with large assortments, the negative effect of variety is mediated by
anticipated regret.
If a purchase decision leads to anticipated regret, then there should arise two
other direct effects on the constructs under discussion here. Proponents of regret
theory argue that even rejected options determine the utility of a selected alternative
(Tsiros 1998; Tsiros and Mittal 2000). For example, the decision to go to the movies
also entails the rejection of the alternative of going to a football game. According to
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regret theory, the rejected option influences the utility of the alternative chosen. The
knowledge of having given up something pleasant leads to a decrease in the
experienced utility of the alternative selected.
As a consequence, there results the relation that additional attractive options can
reduce the expected utility of a preferred option (Schwartz 2000). If the decision-
maker can choose only one alternative, then subjective utility of that alternative will
only depend on this option itself. When more options are available, each additional
alternative could be perceived as a potentially better choice and consequently lower
experienced utility. If consumers indeed anticipate this, the following relation
should hold:
H4: anticipated regret has a negative influence on the anticipated utility of the
preferred alternative.
As explained above, decision-makers can be induced to invest more effort in a
purchase decision when they see a utility in additional effort. If individuals
experience anticipated regret, the utility of a copious deliberation process lies in the
reduction of negative post-purchase effects. It is especially important to consider in
such a case that regret can be triggered, not least of all, by a quick or careless
decision-making process. For example, a student who fails a test will experience
especially deep regret if he has failed to prepare himself thoroughly. On the other
hand, if he is unsuccessful in spite of having prepared himself as well as possible, he
may simply experience disappointment instead of regret since the result is outside of
his sphere of responsibility (van Dijk et al. 1999). Accordingly, individuals who
anticipate regret before their purchase should try to reduce the danger of post-
purchase regret through intensive deliberation.
For regret, it is essential to be able to reflect upon a potentially better conduct
(Zeelenberg et al. 1998). A purchase decision which is not well thought-out is
completely in the decision-maker’s realm of responsibility. Moreover, individuals
find it particularly easy after the purchase to mentally simulate intensive pre-
purchase efforts (Zeelenberg 1999b). Individuals are evidently willing to invest
mental and temporal resources in order not to have to reproach themselves for
having committed a mistake which could have been avoided through careful
deliberation. Consequently, anticipated regret stands in direct causal relation with
elaborate purchase decisions (Zeelenberg 1999a).
H5: anticipated regret has a positive effect on the evaluation costs of the purchase
decision.
Figure 1 presents a graphical model that summarizes the focal concepts and
relationships considered in this article. Note that the relation between perceived
variety and purchase probability, according to theory, does not represent a linear but
rather an inverted U-shaped relation. The relation is shown as a broken line since
while the mediators are controlled, no significant or at least a weak effect should be
present. The three variables anticipated utility, anticipated regret and evaluation
costs were hypothesized to explain the relationship between variety and purchase
probability. In addition, our discussion suggests that regret drives both anticipated
product utility and anticipated regret. According to theory, variety should have a
stronger impact on anticipated product utility for small than for large assortments.
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Conversely, anticipated regret as well as evaluation costs should be stronger
affected by variety in large rather than small assortments.
3 Empirical analysis
3.1 Data and measures
We utilize data from a probability sample of actual customers of three different
stores of a major electronics retailing chain in Germany. Our data is thus related to
actual purchase decisions as opposed to hypothetical decisions made in a lab setting.
This is important, since key constructs such as anticipated regret may be
experienced differently when individuals are faced with decisions with actual
consequences rather than hypothetical decisions made in a lab setting (Luce et al.
2001). Participants were contacted during August 2004. The sample was restricted
on customers who intended to buy either a digital camera or a DVD player. These
two product categories were chosen because they varied in variety across categories
and stores.
To insure actual deliberation about the available options only those customers
were contacted who deliberated more than 5 min about the available options.
Respondents were further screened by including only those customers who
explicitly stated that they indented to purchase a product when entering the store.
Customers who met both criteria were personally interviewed using a standardized
survey instrument that consisted of measures for each construct of our model. Out of
596 answers obtained, 13 had to be eliminated due to inconsistent answers and a
large number of missing values. The remaining 583 responses consisted of 295
Variety
Anticipated
Product
Utility
Anticipated
Regret
Evaluation
Costs
Purchase
Probability
Fig. 1 Research model
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(50.60%) customers who purchased a product and 288 (49.40%) who decided not to
purchase. 367 (62.95%) individuals were interested in a digital camera and 216
(37.05%) in a DVD player. Participants’ ages ranged from 18 to 75 years and were
28.72% female with a mean age of 38.31 years.
Whenever possible, we employed extant literature to measure our model’s
constructs. Anticipated product utility was measured using a four-item scale that
was based on Kahn and Wansink (2004). For measuring evaluation costs a five-item
scale based on Loewenstein (1999) as well as Huffman and Kahn (1998) was used.
The scale for anticipated regret was based on Chatterjee and Heath (1996) as well as
Sweeney et al. (2000). All items were measured on seven-point scales. In addition,
we asked participants whether or not they purchased a product (yes/no) and about
their perception of the numbers of alternatives being offered on a 13-point scale.
We employed LISREL to conduct confirmatory factor analysis of the continuous
scales used (omitting the binary purchase variable). The measurement model has
high levels of internal consistency, convergent validity, and discriminant validity
(Bagozzi 1980). Globally, the measurement model with all 14 continuous indicators
achieves a good fit (v2 = 222, df = 72, RMSEA = 0.06, CFI = 0.98, TLI = 0.98).
Coefficient alpha for the three multi-item constructs ranged from 0.86 to 0.90 and
average variance extracted from 0.61 to 0.66. We compared the average variance
extracted with the variance shared between all construct pairs to investigate
discriminant validity (Fornell and Larcker 1981). Internal consistency exceeds
Table 1 Measurement model of multi item constructs
Latent and manifest variables Standardized Unstandardized Standard error
Anticipated product utility (qn = 0.61, a = 0.86)
a
Need fulfillment 0.71 0.87 0.05
Pleasure 0.87 1.00 –
Usefullness 0.77 0.88 0.04
Satisfaction 0.79 0.90 0.04
Anticipated regret (qn = 0.66, a = 0.89)
Potential superiority of competing products 0.82 1.00 –
Certainty to identify best product (R)b 0.81 0.92 0.04
Good feeling about decision (R) 0.79 0.98 0.05
Fear irreversibility 0.83 0.97 0.04
Evaluation costs (qn = 0.65, a = 0.90)
Energy 0.79 0.88 0.04
Effort 0.78 0.86 0.04
Time 0.77 0.82 0.04
Amount of thinking 0.84 1.00 –
Complexity of decision 0.84 0.97 0.04
a qn is Fornell and Larcker’s (1981) average variance extracted, a measure of convergent validity. a is
Cronbachs coefficient alpha
b R Reversed coded items
All factor loadings are statistically significant at p < 0.01
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external consistency for each construct (the average difference between the variance
extracted and shared variance was 0.38). Details of the measurement model as well
as the indicators used are given in Table 1.
3.2 Model estimation
Our data is consistent with previous research that had evidenced an inverted U-
shaped relation between variety and the probability of purchasing a product. To test
this, we model the simple main effect of perceived variety on the latent probit of
purchasing a product.1 Since we expect a non-linear effect, we employ degree two
polynomials of perceived variety (see Aiken and West 1991, 64–67 for a detailed
discussion on the estimation of curvilinear relationships). Consistent with prior
empirical work, we find a positive effect of variety for the linear term (b = 0.65,
p < 0.001) and a negative effect for the squared term (b = 0.04, p < 0.001),
suggesting that the positive effect of variety decreases as variety increases. A
likelihood-ratio test comparing a linear model without the squared term with the
nonlinear model provides evidence that the inclusion of the squared term improves
log likelihood (v2(1) = 20.44, p < 0.001). To interpret the probit coefficients in more
detail, we calculate the predicted probability of purchasing a product based on the
probit regression for each of the 13 levels of variety perception (as well as the
squared term). A graphical representation of these values as well as the actual share
of customers purchasing a product is shown in Fig. 2.
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Fig. 2 Relationship between perceived variety and probability to purchase a product
1 We decided to test the inverted U-shaped relation by modeling the data on the individual level. Instead
of the probit model, we may have estimated a logit model. To identify probit and logit models the
variance of the error term needs to be fixed. In probit an error variance of 1 is assumed, logit models
assume a variance of p/3. While this assumption is arbitrary, it does not affect the value of predicted
probabilities interpreted below (see Long 1997, 49–50 for a mathematical proof).
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Figure 2 reveals that the positive effect of variety not only decreases with
perceived assortment size but becomes negative for large assortments. Furthermore,
it is interesting to note that extremely low and extremely high values of perceived
variety lead to different predicted purchase probabilities. Participants who perceived
variety as extremely low (1 on the 13-point scale) have a 5.00% probability of
making a purchase. Customers who perceive variety as extremely high (13 on the
13-point scale) have a substantially higher predicted probability of 12.21%.
Apparently, very small assortments are more likely to lead customers to postpone
purchases than very large assortments. In addition, Fig. 2 shows that there seems to
be an optimal medium amount of perceived variety.
To test our hypotheses on the causal mechanism between variety and purchase
probability, we test for mediation. Generally, mediation can be conceptualized by a
series of regressions
Model 1 : Y ¼ b1 þ sXE þ e1 ð1Þ
Model 2 : Y = b2 + s‘XE + bXM + e2 ð2Þ
Model 3 : XM ¼ b3 þ aXE þ e3 ð3Þ
Baron and Kenny (1986) suggest three conditions for mediation. The first
condition tests whether the exogenous variable (XE) determines the target variable
(Y) if the mediator is not considered (Eq. 1). The second condition entails the test of
whether each preceding variable can explain variance in the variable that follows it.
Thus, the mediator (XM) should have a significant effect on Y (Eq. 2), and XM, in
turn, should be determined by XE (Eq. 3). Finally, s0 should not be significant when
controlling for XM. Baron and Kenny (1986) speak in this case of complete
mediation but point out that in socio-scientific research, multiple mediators are
common, and often only partial mediation (s0 < s) can be proven. The testing of
individual causal relationships is concerned less with a statistical test for mediation
than with a test for necessary conditions (MacKinnon et al. 2002). The method does
not permit the estimation of standard errors or confidence intervals for the mediated
effect. Furthermore, it is difficult to extend the procedure to multiple mediators
(Lehmann 2001).
A statistical test for the intervening effect must investigate statistical significance
of the difference s  s0 (Freedman and Schatzkin 1992; MacKinnon et al. 1995;
Clogg et al. 1992). If this difference is significant, partial mediation is established.
In addition, if |s| > 0 and s0 = 0, data provides evidence for full mediation. The effect
s of the exogenous variable on the target variable without controlling for the
mediator corresponds to the total effect between both variables, i.e., the sum of the
direct and indirect effect while the mediator is controlled (s = s0 + a b). The
difference of the coefficients s  s0 thus corresponds to the product a b (MacKinnon
and Dwyer 1993; MacKinnon et al. 1995).
Accordingly, mediation can be tested by concentrating on the product of the
coefficients or the indirect effect between the exogenous variable and mediator (a)
and mediator and target variable (b). The most widely applied test of this kind is the
test of Sobel (1982) which tests the product of coefficients over its standard error
computed by
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rab ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
a2r2b þ b2r2a
q
ð4Þ
Simulation studies for mediation tests show especially small Type I and Type II
errors for this procedure (MacKinnon et al. 1995). In the following, this test will be
applied to the unobserved probit to purchase or not to purchase (Y*) as a dependent
variable. Equations (1) and (2) are then:
Model 1 : Y ¼ b1 þ sXE þ d1 ð5Þ
Model 2 : Y ¼ b2 þ s‘XE þ bXM þ d2 ð6Þ
In order to define a scale for the unobserved variable Y*, the variance of the error
term in probit regressions is fixed to 1. As the error variance is fixed, the values for
s0 und b are dependent not only on XE und XM but also on the remaining explanatory
variables. Correspondingly, the difference s0  s cannot be interpreted as it is with a
linear regression since here no observable fixed variance of the dependent variables
is present. Accordingly, especially high values for b (which make mediation more
probable) lead to very small values for s0  s, i.e., to substantial Type II errors
(MacKinnon and Dwyer 1993). MacKinnon and Dwyer (1993) suggest a
standardization procedure and show that, with the aid of this procedure, reliable
Sobel tests for mediation can be conducted. In the following we will therefore report
standardized coefficients and conduct Sobel tests based on this method to
investigate the significance of the difference s0  s, i.e., whether the hypothesized
variables mediate the relation between variety and purchase probability.
Since all mediating variables represent unobserved latent constructs, we employ
structural equation modeling to estimate the direct and indirect effects of the model
presented in Fig. 1. We had predicted different causal mechanisms for low and high
variety assortments. To analyze these differences, we perform a median split (7,
>7) of perceived variety and analyze the small to medium and medium to large
variety group of customers separately. We estimate our model in Fig. 1 using
Muthe´n’s (1984) continuous/categorical variable methodology based on robust
weighted least squares.2 Based on the standardized parameter estimates we
conducted Sobel-tests to investigate whether the three mediating variables
evaluation costs, anticipated regret and anticipated product utility serve to explain
the causal mechanism between variety and purchase probability.
3.3 The positive effect of product variety
In a first step, we estimated our full model of Fig. 1 for the low to medium variety
assortment perception (the increasing part of the slope in Fig. 2). Again, we used the
2 The more frequently used maximum likelihood (ML) method for model estimation is not applicable in
our case since our depended variable has the two binary values of ‘‘purchase’’ and ‘‘no purchase’’. In
such cases ML would result in inflated v2 fit statistics, biased model parameters and standard errors
(Hutchinson and Olmos 1998; Green et al. 1997; Muthe´n and Kaplan 1992; Babakus et al. 1987).
Therefore, we estimate our model based on polychoric correlations instead of variances and covariances
(as in ML estimation) (see Flora and Curran 2004 for a more detailed discussion).
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probit link function for model estimation. Overall model fit was acceptable
(v2 = 257, df = 83, RMSEA = 0.08, CFI = 0.94, TLI = 0.92).
While hypothesis 4 predicted a negative effect of anticipated regret on
anticipated product utility, hypothesis 5 predicted a positive effect of anticipated
regret on evaluation costs. Both hypotheses are supported at p < 0.001 (see Table 2).
We find a negative effect of regret on utility (b = 0.47) and a positive effect of
regret on evaluation costs (b = 0.62). As expected, neither anticipated regret nor
evaluation costs are driven by perceived variety in the case of low variety
assortments (p > 0.10). Interestingly, both constructs are important in explaining
purchase probability. Evaluation costs exert a strong direct impact on the probability
of making a purchase (b = 0.32, p < 0.001). The direct effect of anticipated regret
is not significant (p > 0.10) when controlling for evaluation costs. However, the
product of the coefficients for the effect of regret on evaluation costs and evaluation
costs on purchase probability is significant at p < 0.001 (bindirect = 0.19). This
means that the total effect of anticipated regret on purchase probability is indirect
(mediated) by evaluation costs.
Obviously, anticipated product utility should have an additional positive impact
on purchase likelihood, which is what we find (b = 0.19, p < 0.05). We also find that
utility is driven by perceived variety (b = 0.30, p < 0.001). However, we obtain only
partial support for Hypothesis 1, which predicted that anticipated product utility
would explain the positive relationship between variety and purchase likelihood for
small assortments. When we ran a model without all mediators, we found a
significant positive effect of variety on purchase probability (b = 0.18, p < 0.01).
However, this effect decreased only slightly to b = 0.13 (p < 0.10) when we added
anticipated utility as a mediator to this model. It further decreased to b = 0.11
(p = 0.10) when we estimated the full model with all mediators (see Table 2). A
Sobel test of the indirect effect of perceived variety over utility on purchase
likelihood is only marginally significant. The indirect effect of 0.05 (p < 0.10)
demonstrates that utility explains only 0.05 of the total effect of 0.18 between
variety and purchase probability. This corresponds to the difference in coefficients
between the model without all mediators and the one including only anticipated
utility (s0  s in Eqs. 5 and 6).
None of the other indirect links between variety and purchase probability is
significant (pSobel > 0.20), i.e. evaluation costs and anticipated regret also do not
serve to explain the relation between variety and purchase probability for low
variety assortments. Consequently, we must conclude that additional constructs not
measured in this study seem to be necessary in order to fully account for the positive
relationship between variety and purchase probability.
3.4 The negative effect of product variety
Overall model fit for the medium to high variety group (the decreasing part of the
slope in Fig. 2) was better (v2 = 143, df = 83, RMSEA = 0.05, CFI = 0.97,
TLI = 0.96). Consistent with the low to medium variety group, the results support
Hypotheses 5, i.e. anticipated regret increases evaluation costs (b = 0.68,
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p < 0.001). However, we find only weak evidence for H4. Anticipated regret
decreases anticipated product utility by b = 0.19 (p < 0.10, see Table 2).
In contrast to the low to medium variety group, we find no direct effect of variety
on anticipated product utility (p > 0.10). However, we find a small and negative
indirect effect of variety over anticipated regret on utility (bindirect = 0.06,
pSobel < 0.10). The effect is counterintuitive since added options should enable
Table 2 Parameter estimates and mediation tests for theoretical model
Dependent variables with predictors beneath Low to medium
variety
Medium to high
variety
ba p ba p
Direct effects
Anticipated product utility (r2 = 0.31)b (r2 = 0.04)
Perceived variety 0.30 0.00 0.10 0.16
Anticipated regret 0.47 0.00 0.14 0.08
Ancitipated regret (r2 = 0.00) (r2 = 0.17)
Perceived variety 0.02 0.77 0.41 0.00
Evaluation costs (r2 = 0.38) (r2 = 0.52)
Perceived variety 0.01 0.79 0.10 0.09
Anticipated regret 0.62 0.00 0.68 0.00
Purchase probability (r2 = 0.27) (r2 = 0.32)
Perceived variety 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.39
Anticipated product utility 0.19 0.04 0.26 0.00
Anticipated regret 0.12 0.33 0.20 0.12
Evaluation costs 0.32 0.00 0.56 0.00
Indirect effects (or s – s’) c
Purchase probability
Perceived variety ? anticipated regret 0.00 0.77 0.08 0.13
Perceived variety ? evaluation costs 0.00 0.79 0.05 0.10
Anticipated regret ? evaluation costs 0.19 0.00 0.38 0.00
Perceived variety ? anticipated regret ? evaluation costs 0.00 0.77 0.16 0.00
Perceived variety ? anticipated product utility 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.19
Anticipated regret ? anticipated product utility 0.09 0.05 0.04 0.15
Perceived variety ? anticipated regret ?anticipated product
utility
0.00 0.77 0.02 0.16
Evaluation costs
Perceived variety ? anticipated regret 0.01 0.77 0.28 0.00
Anticipated product utility
Perceived variety ? anticipated regret 0.00 0.77 0.06 0.09
a b Represents standardized parameter estimates
b r2 Represents variances explained in exogenous constructs by exogenous and endogenous antecedent
constructs
c s  s0 Represents difference in coefficients for the effect of perceived variety without (s) and with
mediator (s’)
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consumers to find a product that matches their preferences more closely. However,
more options also increase potential regret, and the fear of regret in turn decreases
expected utility. As variety increases beyond an optimal amount, the negative
indirect effect seems to dominate the positive one.
Again, we also ran a simple model without all mediators. As expected, we
found a significant negative effect of variety on purchase probability (b = 0.25,
p < 0.01). Estimation of the full model, however, resulted in a non-significant
relation between both variables (b = 0.08, p > 0.10). Consistent with Hypothesis
1 and in contrast to the low variety analysis, no evidence could be found for an
indirect effect over utility on purchase likelihood (bindirect 0.03, pSobel > 0.10).
Apparently, anticipated product utility does not serve to explain the negative
relationship between variety and purchase likelihood for high variety assortments.
Hypotheses 2 and 3 had instead predicted that increased evaluation costs and
anticipated regret would each mediate the link for large assortments. However, the
negative indirect effect for evaluation costs is weak (bindirect = 0.05, pSobel < 0.10)
and the indirect effect for anticipated regret is not significant. This means
evaluation costs alone cannot fully account for the strong total effect between
variety and purchase probability (b = 0.25 is only diminished by 0.05 due to
evaluation costs).
Table 2 reveals the reason for both results. While we find no significant direct
effect of anticipated regret on purchase likelihood (b = 0.02, p > 0.10), there is a
strong indirect effect over evaluation costs (bindirect = 0.38, pSobel < 0.001). This
means that the effect of anticipated regret on purchase probability fully flows through
evaluation costs. The impact of perceived variety on evaluation costs, on the other
hand, is mostly explained by anticipated regret as evidenced by a weak direct
(b = 0.10, p < 0.10) and strong indirect effect (bindirect = 0.28, pSobel < 0.001).
According to these results, the relationship is more complex than initially
hypothesized. Apparently, the bulk of the negative link between variety and
purchase probability is explained by anticipated regret and evaluation costs in
conjunction. Variety seems to have a strong negative effect only if it increases
anticipated regret and only if anticipated regret in turn increases evaluation costs,
which then decrease purchase probability. This is supported by a significant indirect
effect over both constructs (bindirect = 0.16, pSobel < 0.001).
In summary, the results for the medium to high variety group differ markedly
from the low to medium variety group. While the positive effect of variety is
partially mediated by anticipated utility, the negative effect of variety is fully
mediated by two different streams. First, there is a weak indirect effect over
evaluation costs. Second, there is a strong indirect effect of variety on anticipated
regret, which in turn impacts evaluation costs, which then drive purchase
probability. Across both groups evaluation costs directly reduce purchase
probability, and anticipated product utility directly increases purchase probability.
Interestingly, both analyses show that anticipated regret has a negative but only
indirect effect over anticipated product utility (in the case of low variety) and via
evaluation costs (in the case of high variety) on the likelihood of making a
purchase.
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4 Discussion and implications
This paper makes several contributions. First, it provides additional evidence for the
positive but also negative impact of variety on consumer’s interest in purchasing a
product. Consistent with previous empirical results, it has been shown that variety
increases purchase probability only up to an optimal point. After that, variety
demotivates consumers from making a purchase. Second, it was demonstrated that
the negative effect of variety operates via anticipated regret and evaluation costs and
that the positive effect of variety operates via anticipated utility. This paper has
provided evidence that anticipated regret, presumably one of the most potent factors
in decision making (Schwartz et al. 2002), operates only indirectly on purchase
likelihood by decreasing anticipated utility in small assortments and by increasing
evaluation costs in large assortments. In particular, it seems that anticipated regret
only exerts its negative effect when it serves to increase evaluation costs (see also
Heitmann and Herrmann 2006).
These findings have several implications for retailers as well as manufacturers
managing assortments. First and foremost, it shows the importance of limiting
variety. Manufacturers but also retailers face high, oftentimes hidden costs from
large variety assortments such as reduced capabilities for research and development
or increased complexity in quality control. All of these costs are difficult to quantify
and may have only long-term effects through increased customer complaints,
necessary revisions or even withdrawals of products. As this paper shows, additional
costs are not only incurred by the companies providing high variety assortments but
also by the customers who are faced with the task of identifying the one best product
for their preferences. This task has been shown to reduce purchase likelihood in the
case of high variety assortments. As a consequence, high variety may, in the worst
case, lead companies towards increased costs and decreased revenues.
We can therefore conclude that variety management seems crucial. While
retailers may directly influence the total number of product alternatives available to
the consumer. Manufacturers may decide about appropriate distribution channels for
their products based on the number of alternatives different channels offer. In
addition, manufacturers may need to control the variety of their own assortments.
Research has shown that customers who encounter a feeling of indecision tend not
only to postpone purchases but also to switch to competing assortments (Gourville
and Soman 2005). To provide a sense of proportion, when Procter and Gamble
reduced their assortment of Head and Shoulders shampoos from 26 to 15, they
experienced an increase in sales of 10% (Schwartz 2000). While such changes in
sales can never be attributed to a single factor, this research has provided an
additional indication that the assortment reduction may have been one of the drivers.
Despite this, there is evidence that a temporary provision of additional options
may be useful to increase visibility for consumers, make use of previous brand
investments or to drive competitors out of the market (Kahn 1998). Companies that
use such tactics may wish to manage the potential negative effects on demand. This
paper has shown that customer’s evaluation costs play a central role in this
context. One approach consistent with this result would be to try to keep evaluation
costs constant as variety increases. This may be done by reducing the number of
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trade-offs. For example, shampoos that differ in terms of amount, scent and price,
will be more difficult to compare than alternatives that differ in only one dimension,
e.g. scent (Shugan 1980). In addition, retailers may choose to present similar
products together while highlighting common and differing product attributes,
which has been shown to reduce consumers’ evaluation costs and consequently
impact purchase decisions (Chernev 1997).
Furthermore, this research has shown that anticipated regret is an important
intervening variable between variety and evaluation costs. There are a number of
ways in which anticipated regret may be managed. Among others, regret can only
arise when individuals are responsible for their own decisions and when decisions
seem irreversible (Zeelenberg 1999a). Whenever consumers can avoid making an
active choice in the face of potentially suboptimal decisions, anticipated regret is
reduced. Companies may decide to feature or recommend one product out of an
assortment. Similarly, they may highlight which alternative has been purchased
most often by other consumers. Such recommended or frequently purchased
products enable consumers to reduce their own perceived responsibility by relying
on the judgment of others. In addition, money back guarantees reduce the
impression of irreversible decisions and thereby anticipated regret. Although such
guarantees are seldom redeemed, they do serve to reduce the fear of irreversible
errors in the mind of the consumer.
There are, of course, limitations to this research. One of the main limitations is
the data. While useful and derived from ‘‘real’’ consumers, it is limited to consumer
electronics, specifically DVD players and digital cameras. The process may differ in
other categories that vary in expenditure level, hedonic versus utilitarian aspects,
involvement, etc. In addition, customers were asked about their previous decision-
making process immediately after they had passed through check-out. Despite the
small time interval between decision and survey, the data is still based on a recall
method that is subject to hindsight bias. Furthermore, a subset of subjects may have
had an idea of the variety offered prior to visiting a store. Consequently, we may
have omitted customers from our analysis who did not show an interest in the stores
we surveyed because they expected variety to be either too low or too high. Thus,
the process discovered here may differ depending on the level of prior knowledge
about the variety being offered.
It is worth noting that we found only weak evidence for the common assumption
made by economists that variety provides a potentially better match between
consumers’ preferences and the alternatives offered. Expected product utility could
explain the causality between variety and purchase probability only in the case of
low variety assortments and here only to a limited degree. Nevertheless, variety did
increase purchase probability. The question of why this relationship exists is worth
investigating in future research. Currently, we can only speculate about further
mediating constructs. Potential candidates include stimulation by the perception of
freedom of choice (Brehm 1972; Deci and Ryan 1985) or anticipation of future
variety seeking (Kahn 1998).
For variety to exert an effect on purchase probability it must be perceived as
either large or small. This research on the causal mechanism between variety and
purchase probability has consequently concentrated on perceived variety instead of
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the objective number of options. However, the causal mechanisms reported here
may also be triggered by additional factors other than actual variety. Factors such as
the shelf space utilized (Broniarczyk et al. 1998), the degree of diversity among
options (Lehmann 1998) or the number of options matching consumer’s screening
criteria (Kahn 1998) have also been proposed to impact variety perceptions. In
addition, we have questioned customers on the number of options not distinguishing
between the variety of products within and across brands. Consistent with the
previous argument, the diversity of options and consequently perceived variety may
be lower for assortments with few brands and many options per brand than for
assortments with many brands and few options per brand. Further research is needed
to examine the relationship between perceived and actual variety in more detail.
This would be valuable since in certain cases even objectively small assortments
may be perceived large enough to demotivate consumers from buying. For example,
Chernev (2003) provides results according to which consumers without a preferred
attribute combination in mind are demotivated by smaller assortments than
consumers with a precise idea of an ideal product.
Several additional directions for future research seem obvious. We were only
able to measure whether or not participants bought a product on a single shopping
occasion. Participants may have simply delayed the transaction and decided to
purchase at a later point in time. Therefore, it would be interesting to replicate our
study with a longitudinal design. In addition, further research may concentrate on
the customers who decided to buy a product to study the effect on customer
retention. Recent research by Heitmann et al. (2007) suggests that the variables
captured in this model may have an effect on satisfaction with the product as well as
repurchase intent. Other research suggests that those customers who do buy may
prefer high variety assortments in the long run, as they enable variety seeking (Bawa
1990). Consequently, research on the long-term effect of high variety assortments
on customer retention would be valuable.
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